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The conjunction fallacy and interference effects
Riccardo Franco §
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Abstract. In the present article we consider the conjunction fallacy, a well known
cognitive heuristic experimentally tested in cognitive science, which occurs for intuitive
judgments in situations of bounded rationality. We show that the quantum formalism
can be used to describe in a very simple way this fallacy in terms of interference effect.
We evidence that the quantum formalism leads quite naturally to violations of Bayes’
rule when considering the probability of the conjunction of two events. Thus we suggest
that in cognitive science the formalism of quantum mechanics can be used to describe
a quantum regime, the bounded-rationality regime, where the cognitive heuristics are
valid.
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1. Introduction
This article addresses two main directions of research: the investigation of how the
quantum formalism is compatible with Bayes’ rule of classic probability theory, and the
attempt to describe with the quantum formalism systems and situations very different
from the microscopic particles. A number of attempts has been done to apply the
formalism of quantum mechanics to research fields different from quantum physics, for
example in the study of rational ignorance [1] and of semantical analysis [2]. Quantum
mechanics, for its counterintuitive predictions, seems to provide a good formalism
to describe puzzling effects of contextuality. In the present article, we will try to
describe within the quantum formalism an important heuristic of cognitive science,
the conjunction fallacy [3]. This heuristic is valid in regime of bounded rationality,
which is characterized by cognitive limitations of both knowledge and cognitive capacity.
Bounded rationality [5] is a central theme in behavioral economics and it concerns with
the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences agents’ decisions. A
first attempt to describe this heuristic in terms of quantum formalism has been done in
[6], without evidencing the importance of interference effects.
This article is organized in order to be readable both from quantum physicists
and from experts of cognitive science. In section 2 we introduce the basic notation of
quantum mechanics, and we show in 2.2 that the quantum formalism describing two
non-commuting observables leads to violations of Bayes’ rule. In section 3 we describe
the answers to a question in bounded-rationality regime in terms of vector state and
density matrix of the quantum formalism. Finally, in section 4 we show how the quantum
formalism can naturally describe the conjunction fallacy.
The main results of this article are: 1) tests on non-commuting observables lead
to violations of Bayes’ rule; 2) the opinion-state of an agent for simple questions with
only two possible answers can be represented, in bounded-rationality regime, by a qubit
state; 3) the different questions in bounded-rationality regime can be formally written
as operators acting on the qubit states; 4) the explicit answer of an agent to a question
in regime of bounded rationality can be described as a collapse of the opinion state
onto an eigenvector of the corresponding operator; 5) The probability relevant to a
question A, when analyzed in terms of the probability relevant to a second question
B (corresponding to a non-commuting operator) evidences the violation of Bayes’ rule.
The conjunction fallacy thus results as a consequence of this general fact.
In conclusion, we present a very general and abstract formalism which seems to
describe the heuristic of conjunction fallacy. We think that a similar study can be
done for other heuristics of cognitive science (this will be presented in new papers).
Thus these heuristics could be simple applications of a general theory describing the
bounded-rationality regime, which probably will lead to new interesting predictions.
This could confirm the hypothesis that the processes of intuitive judgement could involve
mechanisms at a quantum level in the brain.
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2. Quantum basic formalism
We first introduce the standard bra-ket notation usually used in quantum mechanics,
introduced by Dirac [7], and then the density matrix formalism. In particular, we focus
our attention on the concept of qubit. In the simplest situation, a quantum state is
defined by a ket |s〉, which is a vector in a complex separable Hilbert space H . If
the dimension of H is 2, the state describes a qubit, which is the unit of quantum
information. Any quantum system prepared identically to |s〉 is described by the same
ket |s〉.
In quantum mechanics, we call a measurable quantity an observable, mathematically
described by an operator, for example Â, with the important requirement that it is
hermitian: Â = Â†, where Â† is the conjugate transpose. In the case of a single qubit,
any observable Â has two real eigenvalues a0 and a1 and two corresponding eigenvectors
|a0〉 and |a1〉. Another property of hermitian operators is that its eigenvectors, if
normalized, form an orthonormal basis, that is
〈ai|aj〉 = δ(i, j) , (1)
where i, j = 0, 1 and δ(i, j) is the Kroneker delta, equal to 1 if i = j and null otherwise.
Given such a basis in the Hilbert space, we can write them in components as
|a0〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |a1〉 =
(
0
1
)
, (2)
representing the quantum analogue to the two possible values 0 and 1 of a classical
bit. An important difference is that in the quantum case a state can be in a linear
superposition of 0 and 1, that is
|s〉 = s0|a0〉+ s1|a1〉 , (3)
with s0 and s1 complex numbers. We also say that the state |s〉 is a superposition of
the eigenstates |ai〉. In the vector representation generated by formula (2), the ket |s〉
and its dual vector, the bra 〈s|, can be written respectively as
|s〉 =
(
s0
s1
)
, 〈s| =
(
s∗
0
s∗
1
)
. (4)
Another mathematical object, which is important in order to describe probabilities, is
the inner product, also called braket. In general, the inner product of two kets |s〉 and
|s′〉 can be written, in the basis of the obsevable Â, as 〈s|s′〉 = s0s
′
0
∗ + s1s
′
1
∗, where s′i
are the components of |s′〉 in the same basis. Thus the inner product of |s〉 and its dual
vector is 〈s|s〉 = |s0|
2 + |s1|
2, and it is equal to 1 if the vector is normalized. Finally,
|si|
2 = |〈ai|s〉|
2 is the probability P (ai) that the measure on the observable Â has the
outcome i = 0, 1. The state |s〉 is called a pure state, and describes a quantum state for
which the preparation is complete: a preparation is complete when all the compatible
observables have been defined (we will give further a precise definition of compatible
observables).
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In the most general case, a quantum state is described by the density matrix ρ̂,
which is an hermitian operator acting on H . The density matrix ρ̂ describes in general
a mixed state, that is a state for which the preparation is not completely determined.
For example, the state may be in the preparation |s1〉 with a probability P1, and in the
preparation |s2〉 with a probability P2 (the two vectors may be not orthogonal). We
also say that the the mixed state is a (statistical) mixture of the two states (or of the
two preparations):
ρ̂ =
∑
i
Pi|si〉〈si| . (5)
In the particular case where there is only one Pi = 1, we have ρ̂ = |s〉〈s|, that is a
pure state. The opposite situation is when the eigenvalues of the density matrix are all
equal. In the single-qubit example, they are both 1/2, and the resulting operator is the
identity matrix acting on the Hilbert space H :
ρ̂ =
1
2
Î =
1
2
[
1 0
0 1
]
. (6)
The resulting state is called maximally mixed, and can be considered as the situation
where the actual knowledge of the state is null. The elements of the single-qubit density
matrix ρ̂ can be expressed in the basis of Â, with i, j = 0, 1, as
ρi,j = 〈ai|ρ̂|aj〉 . (7)
where the diagonal elements ρi,i represent the probability P (ai) to measure a certain
value ai of the relevant observable. An equivalent expression of these probabilities can
be written in terms of the trace-matrix operation:
P (ai) = Tr(ρ̂|ai〉〈ai|) = ρi,i (8)
This formula is the most general expression of the probability to measure a value ai
of an observable, when operating on quantum systems identically prepared in the state
ρ̂. The formalism of the density matrix helps us to write in the most general form the
mean value of an observable Â as
〈Â〉 = Tr(ρ̂Â) , (9)
which becomes, by using formula (7) and the basis vectors of Â, 〈Â〉 =
∑
i aiP (ai).
2.1. Collapse of the state vector
One of the axioms [7] of quantum mechanics states that, given an initial mixed state
ρ̂ and an observable Â acting on a discrete Hilbert space, we can define from the
eigenvectors {|ai〉} of Â the projection operators {|ai〉〈ai|}, where for a single qubit
i = 0, 1. Thus if the measure of the observable Â is the eigenvalue ai, the state updates
as
ρ̂→ |ai〉〈ai| (10)
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This general formula is valid for an orthonormal basis {|ai〉}, and defines the collapse
of the initial state onto the state vector |ai〉. At first the collapse of the state may seem
quite obvious. For example, given the initial probability distribution P (aj) given by
equation (8) corresponding to the initial state ρ̂, we have from simple calculations that
P (aj)→ P (aj) = δ(ai, aj) . (11)
This means that, after measuring a certain value ai of Â, the probability that the
observable actually has another value aj 6= ai is null. This fact is valid also in classic
probability theory. Nevertheless, we will show in the next subsection that the collapse
leads to violation of classic laws of probability theory when considering more than one
observable.
Finally we note that, in the study of rational ignorance presented in [1], the collapse
admits a very simple interpretation. Given an initial opinion state, described by ρ̂ and
a question Â, after a subject has given an answer ai, the probability that the repetition
of the same question Â in the same conditions gives a different answer is null.
2.2. Non-commuting operators and Bayes’ rule
In quantum mechanics the operators associated to the observables may not commute:
for example, given two operators Â and B̂, acting on the same Hilbert space H , the
ordered product ÂB̂ can be different from B̂Â: in this case the two operators do not
commute and we write [Â, B̂] 6= 0, where [Â, B̂] = ÂB̂ − B̂Â is the commutator of the
two observables. The consequences of this fact are very important, and lead to violation
of Bayes’ rule. Let us consider for simplicity a single-quit system and the eigenvectors
{|ai〉} and {|bi〉} of Â and B̂ respectively (with i = 0, 1). The probability of measuring
the value ai or bi for the observables Â or B̂ respectively is given by equation (8), that
is:
P (ai) = Tr(ρ̂|ai〉〈ai|); P (bi) = Tr(ρ̂|bi〉〈bi|) . (12)
We now consider the conditional probability P (bj|ai), defined as the probability to
measure the observable B̂ with value bj , given the occurrence of a measurement of Â
with value ai. In quantum mechanics, the occurrence of a measurement of Â with
result ai means that the actual state is |ai〉, independently from the initial state before
the measurement. This is a consequence of the quantum collapse, and leads to many
differences form the classic case. In quantum mechanics thus we have that
P (bj|ai) = |〈bj |ai〉|
2 = P (ai|bj) . (13)
Let us now consider the Bayes’ rule, which defines the joint probability to measure
contemporarily the values ai and bj for observables A and B respectively:
P (ai)P (bj|ai) = P (bj)P (ai|bj) = P (ai, bj) . (14)
This equation is very important in classical probability theory, since it links the joint
probabilities relevant to Â and B̂ to the conditional probabilities. In quantum mechanics
one can not measure contemporarily two commuting operators. From a formal point of
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view, this impossibility is evidenced from the fact that, by using the equations (12) and
(13), we have in general that
P (ai)P (bj|ai) 6= P (bj)P (ai|bj) (15)
This means that the joint probability P (ai, bj) can not be univocally defined. What we
can rigorously define is
P (ai → bj) = P (ai)P (bj |ai) , (16)
where P (ai → bj) is the probability to measure ai for the observable Â and then
the answer bj for the observable B̂ . Form the previous observation, we have that
P (ai → bj) 6= P (bj → ai). We call P (ai → bj) the consecutive probability to measure
ai and then bj . Equation (15) evidences that in quantum mechanics the Bayes’ rule
is violated. Many of the paradoxical results of quantum mechanics are due to this
violation. In the present article, we will focus our attention on the conjunction fallacy,
which we will study in the next sections.
3. Bounded rationality and Hilbert spaces
The bounded rationality [5] is a property of an agent (a person which makes decisions)
that behaves in a manner that is nearly optimal with respect to its goals and resources.
In general, an agent acts in bounded-rationality regime when there is a limited time
in which to make decisions, or when he is also limited by schemas and other decisional
limitations. As a result, the decisions are not fully thought through and they are rational
only within limits such as time and cognitive capability. There are two major causes
of bounded rationality, the limitations of the human mind, and the structure within
which the mind operates. This impacts decision models that assume us to be fully
rational: for example when calculating expected utility, it happens that people do not
make the best choices. Since the effects of bounded rationality are counterintuitive and
may violate the classical probability theory (and the Bayes’ rule), we will often speak
of bounded-rationality regime as the set of situations where the bounded rationality is
an actual property.
We will show that some typical behaviors of the bounded-rationality regime can
be described in a very effective way by the quantum formalism. We will study from a
statistical point of view the opinion state of agents having the same initial information.
In particular, we will assume that the opinion state of an agent can be represented as
a qubit state, that is in terms of a density matrix ρ̂ or, in simple cases, of a ket |s〉 in a
Hilbert space H of dimension 2. As in quantum mechanics experiments, it is important
to define carefully the preparation of the opinion state. Every previous information
given to an agent before performing a test can be considered as the preparation of the
opinion state. When we repeat a test on more agents, it is important that their opinion
state is (at least in theory) identically prepared. We note here that it is not easy to
prepare the opinion state of a number of people in an identical state. Nevertheless, the
quantum formalism can help us with the concept of mixed state.
The conjunction fallacy and interference effects 7
The basic test in the context of bounded rationality is a question. We consider
a question A for which the possible answers can only be 0 or 1 (false or true), and
we associate it to an operator Â acting on the Hilbert space H . Like in quantum
mechanics, the question A is an observable, in the sense that we can observe an answer:
thus, when speaking of questions, we will consider directly the associated operator Â.
The answers 0 and 1 are associated to the eigenvalues a0 = 0 and a1 = 1 of Â, while
the eigenvectors |a0〉 and |a1〉 correspond to the opinion states relevant to the answers
0 and 1 respectively:
Â|a0〉 = 0|a0〉 = 0; Â|a1〉 = |a1〉 . (17)
The eigenvectors |a0〉 and |a1〉 have a very precise meaning: if the opinion state of an
agent can be described for example by |a1〉, this means that the answer to the question Â
is 1 with certainty. If we repeat the same question to many agents in the same opinion
state (thus identically prepared), each agent will give the same answer 1. If instead
the opinion state about the question is definitely 0, then we have the eigenvector |a0〉.
Any observable can be written in the basis of its eigenvectors as Â =
∑
i ai|ai〉〈ai|.
A superposition of the opinion states |ai〉 about question Â is, like in equation (3),
|s〉 = s0|a0〉+ s1|a1〉, where |si|
2 = |〈ai|s〉|
2 is the probability P (ai) that the agent gives
an answer i = 0, 1 to the question Â. In the most general case, the opinion state can
be represented as a density matrix ρ̂. The probability that the answer to the question
Â is ai is given by equation (8): P (ai) = Tr(ρ|ai〉〈ai|).
We note that the formalism introduced is the same used to describe questions in
regime of rational ignorance [1], where people choose to remain uninformed about a
question Â. In fact, the bounded rationality can be considered as a more general than
the rational ignorance, where the question is preceded by some additional information.
4. The conjunction fallacy
The conjunction fallacy is a well known cognitive heuristic which occurs in bounded
rationality when some specific conditions are assumed to be more probable than the
general ones. More precisely, many people tend to ascribe higher probabilities to the
conjunction of two events than to one of the single events. The most often-cited example
of this fallacy originated with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman [3] is the case of
Linda, which we will consider carefully in this article. The conjunction fallacy has been
later studied in a detailed way [4], in order to show that the fallacy does not depend by
other factors: for example, the interpretation of expressions like probability and and.
In general, we consider two dichotomic questions A and B, with possible answers
a0, a1 and b0, b1. The typical experiments of [3] and [4] consist in a preparation of the
opinion state, which provides some information to the agent, and the following question:
what is more probable or frequent between a1 (or b1) and a1-and-b1. The agents manifest
in all these experiments a strict preference for the answer a1-and-b1: this evidences the
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conjunction fallacy, since the Bayes’ rule (14) entails that
P (b1) = P (a0)P (b1|a0) + P (a1)P (b1|a1) ≥ P (a1)P (b1|a1) . (18)
In other words, the conjunction of two events a1 and b1 is always less probable than
of one of two events. Nonetheless, the agents often consider more likely a1-and-b1 than
a1 (or b1). We stress that the experimental results of [3] and [4] should be considered
carefully: they give a direct information of how many agents consider the difference
P (a1, b1)− P (a1) positive, not of the probabilities relevant to a1-and-b1 and a1 (or b1).
The probability P (a1, b1) can be obtained with a different test, where it is asked to
the agents if they consider a1-and-b1 true or false, with the information provided in the
preparation of the test.
We now introduce the quantum formalism in order to show that the conjunction
fallacy can be described and interpreted in such a formalism. In particular, we consider
two operators Â and B̂, associated respectively to the questions A and B. Since A and
B are dichotomic questions, we can describe the opinion state of agents as vectors in a
two-dimensional Hilbert space. Both the eigenvectors of Â and B̂, defined by equation
(17), form two orthonormal bases of the Hilbert space H . Thus we can express the
eigenvectors of Â in the basis of the eigenvectors of B̂, obtaining the general equations:
|a0〉 = cos(θ)|b0〉+ sin(θ)e
iφ|b1〉 (19)
|a1〉 = −sin(θ)e
−iφ|b0〉+ cos(θ)|b1〉 ,
and vice-versa
|b0〉 = cos(θ)|a0〉 − sin(θ)e
iφ|a1〉 (20)
|b1〉 = sin(θ)e
−iφ|a0〉+ cos(θ)|a1〉 .
The transformations above are a change of basis, which can be described in terms of a
unitary operator Û (element of SU(2) group) such that
∑
ij Uij|ai〉 = |bj〉. Moreover,
they are useful to compute the conditional probabilities P (a1|b1) = P (a0|b0) = cos
2(θ)
and P (a1|b0) = P (a0|b1) = sin
2(θ). It is important to note that, as evidenced in
[6], in quantum mechanics we can not consider simultaneously the two events a1 and
b1; what we can consider are the conditional probabilities P (a1|b1), remembering that
P (a1|b1)P (a1) could be different from P (b1|a1)P (b1). In other words, the elements of
the two basis of A and B should be handled carefully.
First of all, we consider a mixed state, that is an incoherent mixture of states |ai〉
with probabilities |αi|
2:
ρ̂ = |α0|
2|a0〉〈a0|+ |α1|
2|a1〉〈a1| . (21)
We show that for this state the conjunction fallacy is not allowed: if we compute the
probability P (b1) = 〈b1|ρ̂|b1〉, one obtains by using equation (19) the classical formula
P (b1) = P (a0)P (b1|a0) + P (a1)P (b1|a1) . (22)
This equation is consistent with formula (18), and evidences that P (b1) can not be lower
than P (a1)P (b1|a1). Mixed states thus exhibit a behavior similar to the classic situation,
without conjunction fallacy.
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Let us now consider as the initial state the following superposition
|s〉 = α0|a0〉+ α1|a1〉 (23)
where αi are in general complex parameters such that P (ai) = |αi|
2, reproducing the
same statistical predictions for Â of (21). By using equation (19), we can express this
state in the basis of B̂, obtaining
|s〉 = [α0cos(θ)− α1sin(θ)e
−iφ]|b0〉+ [α0sin(θ)e
iφ + α1cos(θ)]|b1〉. (24)
We now consider the probabilities P (a1), P (b1) and the conditional probability P (a1|b1):
from equation (24), we have that P (b1) is |α0sin(θ)e
iφ + α1cos(θ)|
2, obtaining
P (b1) = P (a0)P (b1|a0) + P (a1)P (b1|a1) +Re[α0α
∗
1
sin(2θ)eiφ] (25)
The presence of the last term, known as the interference term I(s, A) can produce
conjunction fallacy effects: in fact, if we impose that P (a0)P (b1|a0) + I(s, A) < 0, we
have P (b1) < P (a1)P (b1|a1). Thus the sign of the interference term can determine the
conjunction fallacy, while the parameter φ can give to this effect more or less strength.
A positive interference term enhances the prevalence of P (b1) on P (a1, b1), which can
be considered a reverse conjunction fallacy. The conjunction fallacy can appear also for
P (a1), if we write the same initial state in the basis of B̂
|s〉 = β0|b0〉+ β1|b1〉 (26)
The probability P (a1) can be written, with similar calculations, as
P (a1) = P (b0)P (a1|b0) + P (b1)P (a1|b1)−Re[β0β
∗
1
sin(2θ)eiφ] (27)
evidencing once again an interference term I(s, B). If we want the presence of
conjunction fallacy P (a1) < P (b1)P (a1|b1), we impose P (b0)P (a1|b0) + I(s, B) < 0.
We consider now the results presented in [10], where several probability combination
models for conjunction errors are presented: we want to show that the use of quantum
formalism allows us to explain the experimental data (and in particular the results of
table III of [11]) in a more complete way. We consider for simplicity real superposition
coefficients αi, βj, and φ = 0: interference effects can occur also without complex
numbers. Moreover, since |α0|
2 + |α1|
2 = 1, we can write α0 = acos(θa), α1 = asin(θa),
with a positive number. Thus the basis transformation (19) leads to the simple relations
β0 = acos(θa − θ) and β1 = asin(θa − θ). It is evident that the angle θ controls the
correlations between the questions A and B: for θ ≃ 0 the answers a1 and b1 are strictly
correlated, for θ ≃ ±pi/4 they are uncorrelated, while for θ ≃ ±pi/2 they are anti-
correlated. Similarly, θa controls the probabilities P (ai): if θa ≃ 0, then P (a1) ≃ 1, and
if θa ≃ ±pi/2, then P (a1) ≃ 0. The presence of conjunction fallacy for P (b1) and P (a1)
entails, with such assumptions, respectively
1 + 2tan(θa)cotan(θ) < 0 (28)
1− 2tan(θa − θ)cotan(θ) < 0
where cotan(x) = tan(x)−1. These two formulas can take into account from a qualitative
point of view the experimental results of [11]: for correlated questions ( θ ≃ 0) the
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two inequalities are simultaneously satisfied for a range of θa such that θa ≃ pi/2 and
θa − θ > pi/2, which means a configuration of probability P (a1)/P (b1) high/high. This
configuration also allows a range of θa zero conjunction errors, for θ positive. For anti-
correlated questions ( θ ≃ ±pi/2) the two inequalities can not simultaneously satisfied;
only one inequality can be satisfied when |θa| ≃ ±pi/2, which means a configuration of
probability high/low or low/high. Finally, for uncorrelated questions ( θ ≃ ±pi/4)
the two inequalities are simultaneously satisfied when θa ≃ ±pi/2, which means a
configuration of probability high/high.
In [10] other possible models to explain these data are presented; for example,
the probability combination models, where level of ratings of probability R(A), R(B)
are connected to the belief strength S(A), S(B)) through a function M nonlinear.
A modified version of this model introduces the additional term s0, which can be
interpreted as the initial impression. In [11] has been purposed a signed summation
of belief strength, reproducing some of the the conjunction effects, but allowing for
presence of self contradictory conjunction. Moreover, in [10] some arguments against
the representativeness interpretation of conjunction fallacy are presented: the unrelated
case, in fact, seems to be unexplained by representativeness arguments.
Finally, we note that the experiments evidencing the conjunction fallacy show the
rates of agents which have considered the conjunction of the two events more probable
than the single events: in other words, the experiments show how many agents have
considered P (a1, b1) higher than P (b1) for example. Equation (25) entail that if all the
agents are in the same state (23), then the rate of agents which exhibit conjunction
fallacy is 100%. To solve this difference from experimental data, we note that we have
used the hypothesis that all the agents are in the same state (23). However, the quantum
formalism allows us to prepare the opinion state in a more general way: for example,
we can prepare agents in the state (23) with a probability P1, and in a state (21)
which does not exhibit conjunction fallacy with a probability 1− P1, thus reproducing
the experimental predictions. At the moment, the experimental data are not enough to
determine completely the initial state of the system: in fact, we should measure not only
the frequency of agents for which P (a1) is lower than P (a1, b1), but also P (a1), P (b1)
and the conditional probabilities P (ai, bj).
4.1. Other quantum approaches
We note that a recent paper [12] contains a different attempt to describe a similar fallacy
in terms of quantum formalism. In particular, the experimental results of Hampton [13]
are considered: given two concepts A and B and an item X, the membership weights
relevant to A and B (µ(A) and µ(B)) are compared with µ(Aor B). The experiment
of [13] evidences that in many cases µ(AorB) < µ(A) and µ(AorB) < µ(B). This
effect is called underextension of the two concepts A and B. The attempt of [12] is
to deduce this effect from the description of concept membership in terms of quantum
formalism. In particular, the situation of complete membership respect to the concept
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A is described by the ket |A〉, while the opposite situation (complete non-membership)
by the orthogonal vector |A′〉. Similarly for the concept B, we have |B〉 and |B′〉. The
membership to A of an item X, which corresponds to the vector |X〉, is given in this
formalism by |〈A|X〉|2 = µ(A). The ket |X〉 can be written in the basis A−A′ or B−B′,
obtaining
|X〉 = aeiα|A〉+ a′eiα
′
|A′〉 (29)
|X〉 = beiβ |B〉+ b′eiβ
′
|B′〉 (30)
We show now that the approach of [12], even if good in its starting points, contains a
mistake in the use of the quantum formalism. The crucial point is the introduction of
the vector |AB〉 = |A〉+ |B〉, which is used to compute the membership of |X〉 relevant
to the concept Aor B: we expect that this vector describes a composite concept which
contains with equal weights the concept A and B. By using equation (20), we can
write |B〉 = sinθe−iφ|A′〉 + cos(θ)|A〉. and thus |A〉 + |B〉 should be interpreted as a
superposition ψa|A〉+ ψ
′
a|A
′〉, where ψa = 1 + cos(θ): this is incorrect, since |〈AB|A〉|
2
should be 1/2. In other words, [12] has obtained an underextension of concepts not only
for the item X but also for the constituent concept A.
A second critique is that we could also consider |A〉+ eiλ|B〉, obtaining completely
different effects and leading to an ambiguity in the formalism; moreover, |A〉 and |B〉
are contained in two different basis and it is important in the quantum formalism to
write each vector in terms of vectors of a single basis.
We think that the right approach to the problem is to express µ(Aor B) in terms
of µ(A) + µ(B) − µ(AandB). Even if the quantum formalism evidences problems in
considering simultaneously states of different basis, we can use equations (25) and (27)
to show that µ(A) < µ(A,B) or µ(B) < µ(A,B), thus obtaining that µ(AorB) < µ(A)
or µ(Aor B) < µ(B) (connected to the underextension effect).
5. New fallacies
The rich mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and the interference effects
allow us to predict or explain other fallacies in the bounded-rationality regime. For
example, 1) the ordering effects, 2) the disjunction effect, 3) the conditional probability
fallacy, 4) the framing effect and 5) the uncertainty effect. We give in this final section
a brief description of these effects, which will be described in other articles.
1) In the bounded-rationality regime, the order with which we consider two
questions A and B is important (see also the case of rational ignorance [1]). Similarly
to the repeated Stern-Gerlach experiment, we ask a question relevant to the operator Â,
then a second question relevant to the non-commuting operator B̂ and finally again Â.
Equation (16) defines the probability that the result of the second question is bj , given
ai. But the third measure leads to a non-null probability P (ak → bj) for k 6= i: in other
words the third question can give a result for the observable Â different from the first.
The bounded rationality situation has manifested an irrational behavior of the agent.
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The question Â has been asked two times, but what has been changed is the context.
The opinion state of the agent in the test has evidenced a contextuality effect. Thus it
has great importance, in bounded rationality, also the temporal order of the different
questions.
2) The disjunction effect is an intriguing phenomenon discovered by Tversky and
Shafir [9] with important consequences in modelling the interactions between inference
and decision. This effect, like the conjunction fallacy, considers the probabilities relevant
to two events which can be associated to two non-commuting operators. A first attempt
to give an explanation of the effect within the quantum formalism has been given by
[14], by considering the two questions relevant to two different Hilbert spaces. The
consequences of this approach are that we obtain an entangled state, but also that
the evolution of the initial state can lead to a state which contradicts the initial
information given to the agent. A new explanation of the disjunction effect will be
given in a separate paper: here we only observe that the conjunction fallacy can be
applied to show how the perceived probability P (b1) (for example) can be lower than
P (a0)P (b1|a0)+P (a1)P (b1|a1), because the interference terms like in equation (25) may
appear.
3) The framing effects may have a similar explanation of the conjunction and
disjunction effect: the interference terms in fact are able to lower the probability P (bj)
when the initial information lead to an opportune pure state in a basis relevant to a
non-commuting operator.
4) The conditional probability fallacy is the assumption that P (aj |bi) = P (bi|aj).
In classical probability theory this is not valid in general, while in quantum mechanics
it is always true, as can be seen from equation (13).
5) Finally we make the hypothesis of the existence of an uncertainty effect, which
is a consequence of the well-known uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics. The
experimental data of [4] show that a not-null percentage of agents in the tests fails in the
implication X−and−Y |= X, Y . We argue that this percentage may change, depending
on the commutator of the associated operators X̂, Ŷ . The uncertainty principle in
Hilbert spaces with discrete dimension has been formulated in a more general form
[15]: given the uncertainty of an observable X̂, defined as the statistical variance of the
randomly fluctuating measurement outcomes δ2(Â) = 〈Â2〉−〈Â〉2, the local uncertainty
relations [15] state that, for any set {X̂, Ŷ , Ẑ, ...} of non-commuting operators, there
exist a non-trivial limit U such that δ2(X̂) + δ2(Ŷ ) + δ2(Ẑ) + ... ≥ U . This new
form of the uncertainty principle may apply to bounded-rationality regime, leading to
predictions similar to those cited of [4]: even if we try to prepare the opinion state of
agents such that the uncertainty of X and Y is null, the sum δ2(X̂) + δ2(Ŷ ) can not be
null.
All these paradoxical effects in general are due to the usual belief that we can
assign pre-defined elements of reality to individual observables also in regime of bounded
rationality. In a classical situation, if we ask to an agent the two questions associated to
the observables Â, B̂, we can consider simultaneously the two answers (ai, bj), and we
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can study the joint probability P (ai, bj). In a bounded rationality regime, instead, this
is not possible if the related observables are non-commuting. We say that the answers
to these questions can not be known contemporarily, thus giving an important limit to
the complete knowledge of the opinion state of an agent in bounded-rationality regime.
This effect in microscopic world is called quantum contextuality [8], and evidences,
for any measurement, the influence of other non-commuting observables previously
considered.
6. Conclusions
This article, addressed both to quantum physicists and to experts of cognitive
science, evidences the incompatibility of quantum formalism with Bayes’ rule of classic
probability theory, by deriving the violation of equation (18) in bounded-rationality
regime. In particular, we use mathematical objects like vector state and density matrix
to describe the opinion state of agents, and hermitian operators for the questions: in
section 4 we show that the conjunction fallacy can be explained as an interference effect
when two different questions (relevant to two non-commuting operators) are considered.
This seems to confirm the comment of [4], for which the conjunction fallacy seems to
involve failure to coordinate the logical structure of events with first impressions about
chance. The first impressions about chance may be encoded in the quantum phase,
which leads to interference effects. In fact, we have seen that states (23) and (21) do
not differ for the statistical predictions of A, but for the presence of a phase, which gives
us the information of how the same superposition of states is considered initially by the
agent.
Thus we conclude that the conjunction fallacy can be considered as a natural
consequence of the quantum formalism used to describe the bounded-rationality regime.
By the way, the formalism introduced does not only give an explanation of the fallacy,
but also has a predictive character: in fact, we have predicted a reverse conjunction
fallacy, for which the probability of the conjunction of two events is much less than the
probability assigned to a single event. Moreover, in section 5 we propose other effects
which are consequences of the formalism introduced.
As evidenced in the conjunction fallacy, the experimental test evidencing these ef-
fects are very difficult to be performed, because they must avoid collateral effects and
the preparation of the opinion states must be considered carefully.
I wish to thank Jerome Busemeyer and Peter Bruza for making very useful comments
and suggestions.
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